Demo Zscaler ZTCA Exam Questions

The correct answer is B . The core security risk of a split tunnel VPN is loss of visibility and consistent inspection for the traffic that bypasses the tunnel and goes directly to the internet. Zscaler’s Secure Mobile Access reference architecture explains that traditional VPNs backhaul traffic to a central data center for security through a legacy appliance stack, while modern remote work leads to a lack of visibility into what users are accessing and how the network is performing when the organization no longer controls the path.
ZIA guidance similarly states that user traffic must be forwarded to the nearest ZIA Service Edge so it can be inspected and either forwarded or blocked according to policy, and that the same authentication and policy should follow the user wherever they are. If some traffic exits directly to the internet outside that enforcement path, the organization loses the visibility and control needed to make reliable policy decisions on those flows. That is the real Zero Trust concern with split tunneling. It creates blind spots rather than a uniformly enforced security model. Therefore, the best answer is loss of visibility into traffic going directly to the internet

This statement is false. In Zscaler’s Zero Trust architecture, the recommended design objective is to

inspect as much encrypted traffic as possible because inspection enables security controls such as
malware protection, sandboxing, intrusion prevention system (IPS), browser isolation, Data Loss
Prevention (DLP), cloud application controls, tenancy restrictions, and file type controls. The
reference architecture states that inspecting all TLS/SSL traffic provides the fullest visibility and
strongest protection across the Zero Trust Exchange. However, the same document also clearly
confirms that inspection bypasses are supported in specific circumstances. These documented
exceptionsinclude banking and finance destinations, healthcare destinations, business functionsthat
require unencryptable traffic, certificate-pinned applications, and some Microsoft 365 application
flows that may not function properly under inspection. Zscaler strongly recommends using bypasses
only in extreme circumstances, but it does not say exceptions are architecturally impossible.
Therefore, from a verified Zero Trust design standpoint, full inspection isthe preferred security
posture, while selective exceptions are still an allowed and documented deployment option.

In Zero Trust architecture, policy enforcement is conditional and context-based, not limited to a

simple binary allow-or-block model. Zscaler’s reference architectures explain that policy is evaluated
using the full user context, including identity, device posture, location, group membership, and other
conditions. Access decisions are therefore based on whether specific policy conditions are true,
rather than only on static network attributes such as source IP address. For example, the same
authenticated user may be allowed access from a managed device at headquarters but denied from
an airport, even with the same credentials.
Zscaler documentation also shows that Zero Trust policy can go beyond simple pass or deny
outcomes by applying additional controls. In DNS Security and Control, requests can be allowed,
blocked, or modified. In ZIA policy development, Cloud App controls allow more granular outcomes
than standard allow/block,such as restricting specific actions, applying quotas, or controlling what a
user can do inside an application. This reflects the Zero Trust principle that enforcement is adaptive,
granular, and tied to business and security context rather than network location alone.